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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
---------------------------------
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
v. 
CHARLES L. CRICK, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 18080 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a criminal action brought by the State of Utah 
against Defendant/Appellant Charles L. Crick and others, alleging 
that said defendants did not unlawfully cause the death of another 
in violation of Utah Code Annotated (1953) as amended, §76-5-203, 
second degree murder, a felony of the first degree. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Defendant/Appellant was found guilty of the charge after 
a trial by jury and was sentenced by the court to be confined in 
the Utah State Prison for the indefinite period of five years to 
life. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks to have his conviction reversed based 
on the prejudicially erroneous failure of the trial court to give 
the properly requested jury instructions on the lesser included 
offense of MANSLAUGHTER, §76-5-205 U.C.A. (1953}, or judgment 
entered for manslaughter~ 
STATEMENT. OF THE. FACTS 
Appellant was charged with murder in the second degree 
for the death on March 15, 1981, of Samuel Taylor Beare, IV. His 
case was joined with that of Mary V. Holloway due to a concurrence 
of witnesses and the criminal episode. However, the action was 
not joined with that of Thomas Garcia. 
A jury trial was held in the District Court of the Third 
Judicial District, Salt Lake County, from September 28, 1981, to 
October 1, 1981~ the Honorable Peter F. Leary presiding. At trial, 
conflicting evidence was heard concerning the culpability of co-
defendants and Mr .... Garcia . ., Most testimony agreed that Mr. Garcia 
was chiefly responsible for the events of March 15th. 
Due to the various evidence and circumstances that miti-
gated Appellant-s culpability, counsel for Appellant submitted a 
proposed instruction on manslaughter (R-110) ~ Upon rejection of 
this instruction, counsel made a timely objection (R-484}~ Where-
upon the court submitted instead Instruction No. 27 to the jury (R-92), 
-2-
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directing that the verdict must be either guilty of criminal homicide, 
murder, second degree; or not guilty. No instruction was given as 
to any possible lesser included offense. After deliberating over 
eleven hours, the jury returned with a verdict of guilty (R-52). 
ARGUMENT 
FAILURE TO GIVE THE PROPERLY REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTION ON THE LESSER INCLUDED 
OFFENSE OF MANSLAUGHTER WAS PREJUDICIALLY 
ERRONEOUS. 
Appellant urges that the present case is one in which the 
trial judge was bound by law to present to the jury the requested 
instructions~ In short, Appellant contends that manslaughter is 
a lesser included offense of murder in the -second degree, that the 
lower court was obligated to charge the jury on said included 
offense, and that the courtws faulure to present the theory through 
an instruction to the jury, with timely objection, is reversible 
error. 
Appellant's first point, that manslaughter is a lesser 
included offense of murder in the second degree seems incontrovert-
ible. "The term vhornicide' is generic and embraces every mode by 
which the life of one person is taken by another." 40 Am. Jur .. 
Homicide §1. 
Beside this statement of the common law, Defendant's claim 
has been established by the courts and laws of the State of Utah. 
See, e~g~ Farrow v. Smith, 541 P 2d~ 1107, 1108(0tah 1975) citing 
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Clown Horse v. State, 170 Neb. 336, 102 N.W~ 2d 625 1960 stating: 
11 
"' •• where the defendant was charged with 
murder in the second degree but convicted of man-
slaughter, the conviction was proper, and the crime 
of manslaughter was an included offense." 
See· State v. Williams, 6 36 P. 2d 109 2, 1097 (Utah 19 81) , 
citing State v. Gandee, 587 P. 2d 1064 (Utah 1978), where in dis-
cussing why carrying a loaded firearm in a vehicle was not a lesser 
offense of carrying a concealed dangerous weapon the court distin-
guished those crimes from the major crime of homicide, "with the 
various lesser degrees thereof." 
provides: 
The present statute defining murder in the second degree 
"Murder in the second degree.--(!) Criminal 
hornicide·constitues murder in the second degree if 
the actor: 
"(a) Intentionally or knowingly causes the 
death of another; or 
"(b) Intending to cause serious bodily injury 
to another, he commits an act clearly dangerous 
to human life that causes the death of another; or 
"(c) Acting under circumstances evidencing a 
deoraved indifference to human life, he recklesslv 
~ ~ 
engaged in conduct which creates a grave risk of 
death of another and thereby causes the death of 
another; or 
11 (d) While in the com.mission, attempted 
commission, or immediate flight from the commission 
or attempted commission of aggravated robberv, 
robbery, rape, forcible sodomy, or aggravated sexual 
assault, aggravated ar~on, a~son, aggravated burgliiry, 
burglary, aggravated kidnapping, or kidnapping, 
causes the death of another person other than a 
party," 
-4-
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"(2) Murder in the second degree is a felony 
of the first degree." 
Section 76-5-203 U.C.A. (1953), as amended. 
While the statute defining manslaughter provides: 
"76-5-205. Manslaughter.--(1) Criminal 
homicide constitutes manslaughter if the actor: 
"(a) Recklessly causes the death of another; 
or 
"(b) Causes the death of another under the 
influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance 
for which there is a reasonable explanation or 
excuse; 
"(c) Causes the death of another under cir-
cumstances where the actor reasonably believes the 
circumstances prov.ide a moral or legal justifica-
tion or extenuation for his conduct although the 
conduct is not legally justifiable or excusable 
under the existing circumstances. 
"(2) Manslaughter is a felony of the second 
degree." 
The distinction between the degrees of homicide is 
the degree of malice~ 
"For many years the definition of second 
degree murder has been the unlawful killing of 
a human being with malice aforethought and that 
of mansalughter was the unlawful killing of a 
human being without malice. In our opinion the 
new criminal code .has not changed those defini-
tions,,," Farrow v .. Smith, supra, 1109, interpret-
ing the above statutes as set forth in the 1975 
Pocket Supplementn 
Given the above statutory definitions and judicial inter-
pretations, Appellant's next point, that the court was obligated to 
give the requested manslaughter instruction, is found in the same 
statute that defines "lesser included offense .. " 
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Section 76-1-402(3), U.C.A., provides: 
''(3) A defendant may be convicted of an 
offense included in the offense charged but may 
not be convicted of both the offense charged and 
the included offense. An offense is so included 
when: 
"(a) It is established by proof of the same 
or less than all the facts required to establish 
the commission of the offense charged; or 
"(b) It constitutes an attempt, solicitation, 
conspiracy, or form of preparation to commit the 
offense charged or an offense otherwise included 
therein; or 
"(c) It is specifically designated by a 
statute as a lesser included offense." 
Section 76-1-402(4) states: 
"(4) The court shall not be obligated to 
charge the jury with respect to an included 
offense unless there is a rational basis for a 
verdict acquitting the defendant of the offense 
charged and convicting him of the included 
offense." 
A proper reading of the above section is that if there is 
a rational basis for the lesser included offense, then it is manda-
tory that the court charge the jury thereon. 
Appellant pleaded and submitted sufficient evidence to 
justify submission of the manslaughter instruction to the jury. This 
court may now "survey the evidence and inferences which admit of 
rational deduction, to determine if there exists reasonable basis 
upon which a conviction of the lesser offense could rest." State v. 
~ugher~x_, 550 P.n 2d 175, 176 (Utah 1976), interpreting §77-33-6, 
u.c.A., 1953, as amended, a precursor to §76-1-402. See also state 
-6-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
v. Gillian, 23 Utah 2d 372, 463 P. 2d 811 (1970). 
In addition to Appellant's own testimony, the record is 
replete with evidence that could arguably exculpate or at least 
reduce his culpability~ For example, there is the testimony of co-
defendant Holloway (beginning R-422); the fact that hcsti..]e~ witnesses 
were friends of Tommy Garcia with bias (R-350); the fact that Tommy 
Garcia was covered with blood while Appellant was not (R-350; R-410; 
Exhibits D-43; D-44; D-45): the fact of diminished capacity through 
possible methadone usage or intoxication (R-429). (See People v~ 
Mosher, 461 P. 2d 659, 82 Cal Rptr 379, 461 ?. 2d 659 (1969); People 
v~ Conley, 64 Cal. 2d 310, 49 Cal. Rptr 81~, 411 P. 2d 911 (1966). 
There is also provocation in a racial slur (R-431) ; a fight in which 
Appellant was not originally involved but may have eventually 
participated in to protect his home or in self-defense, coupled with 
the victim's own bad acts (R-315; R-425, R-431)~ Finally, there 
is the expert medical testimony that the cause of death was multiple. 
stab wounds (R-388)· possibly inflicted by someone in a rage (R-394). 
Appellant had no particular reason to be in a "rage" and testified 
he did not hit or stab the victim (R-461). 
Any of the above is sufficient to create a reasonable basis 
upon which a conviction for a lesser offense could rest~ Taken as a 
totality, their effect is hardly nugatory11 Admittedly a gruesome 
killing had occurred, but such killing was not conclusively estab-
lished by the prosecution to be the result of Appellant's acts suf-
ficient to convict on the greater offense. In determining the degree 
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of homicide Appellant was guilty of, the jury may consider not only 
the nature of the killing, but also the personal turpitude of ·the 
defendant. 
In this case the jury was effectively precluded from 
considering Appellant's malice by the faulty omission of a man-
slaughter instruction. The jury could reasonably have concluded 
that Appellant acted within the parameters of any of the three 
statutory definitions of manslaughter. Section 76-5-205, U.C.A, 
supra. 
When the lower court presumably chose not to believe 
Defendant's testimony or that evidence favorable to him, it over-
s~epped its bounds. Questions of fact are for the jury. "It is 
the sole and exclusive province of the jury to determine the facts 
in all criminal cases, whether the evidence offered by the State is 
weak or strong, is in conflict or is not controverted." 
Appellant would have been merely reckless in joining the 
pre-existing affray and causing injury; he could have been extremely 
disturbed by the events occurring in his home, either the fight 
going on or by finding the victim putting the "make" on his co-
tenant (R-349). 
Interestingly, there is some substantiation in the record 
that the lower court may have felt that Appellant acted ''recklessly" 
See Instruction 11, (R-76), in which the definition of "recklessly" 
was left in by the court. 
-8-
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The fact that some of the evidence is testimony by rlppellant 
himself does not per se destroy its credibility. See State of Utah v. 
Larry Elliott & Harrison Clayton, Nos. 17350, 17351, 17358 {Utah 
January 21, 1982), fn 14, in which the defendant's own testimony was 
used by the court to reverse a lower court conviction in which the 
Jury did not receive lesser included offense instructions. When such 
evidence is received it has the same status as any other evidence, it 
is to be considered by the jury, it is their prerogative to give it 
any credibility they believe it entitled to. Their prerogative, in 
this case, was usurped through lack of proper instruction. 
In interpreting the above information to detennine if there 
was sufficient evidence to reduce the offense, it should be viewed 
in the light most favorable to Appellant. This court has declared: 
"If there be any evidence, however slight, 
on any reasonable theory of the case, under which 
defendant might be convicted of a lesser included 
offense, the trial court must, if requested, give 
an appropriate instruction." State v. Chestnut, 
621 P. 2d 1228, 1232 {Utah 1980) (Emphasis is 
original) See also, Elliott, supra 
It cannot be said that the above evidence is so inherently 
incredible as to preclude presentation of appellant's alternate 
theories or instructions on the lesser included offense to the Jury. 
The length of time the jury was out alone leaves some doubt as to how 
well the elements of the greater offense were established. But given 
only the choice between the greater offense and acquittal, perhaps the 
-9-
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jury chose, erroneously, the lesser of two evils. 
Nor can it be said that the grisly character of the death 
impedes a determination of manslaughter~ Not only was Appellant 
probably not the perpetrator of the grosser acts, but in a similar 
case this court held that even after a pathologist had testified 
that the most serious wounds to the deceased were most likely caused 
by the weapon used by defendant on the chest cavity, the jury might 
have implied no intent to kill. State v. Gaxioca, 550 P.2d 1298 
(Utah 1976). Surely it is not any more unreasonable to instruct a 
jury that similar wounds allegedly made by a defendant were inflicted 
under circumstances tantamount to manslaughter. 
The Supreme Courts of both Utah and the United States 
have declared as a matter of policy and procedural safeguard the 
right of defendant to receive instructions on a lesser offense if 
such is supported by evidence or if there is some doubt as to 
elements of the greater offense. 
"In passing this point we desire to say that 
a trial court should, in every case where there 
is any direct or inferential evidence with respect 
to the different degrees of murder, charge the jury 
with regard to all the degrees, and this rule should 
be followed where there may be any doubt with regard 
to whether the higher degree is established or not. 
This is contemplated by our statute which divides 
crimes into degrees and which requires the jury to 
find in the lesser degree in case of doubt." 
State v. Mewhinney, 42 Utah 498, 134 P. 632, 639. 
-10-
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"While we have never held that a defendant 
is entitled to a lesser included offense instruc-
tion as a matter of due process, the nearly uni-
versal acceptance of the rule in both state and 
federal courts establishes the value to the 
defendant of this procedural safeguard. That 
safeguard would seem to be especially important 
in a case such as this.. For when the evidence 
unquestionably establishes that the defendant 
is guilty of a serious, violent offense -- but 
leaves some doubt with respect to an element 
that would justify conviction of a capital 
offense -- the failure to give the jury the 
'third option' of convicting on a lesser in-
cluded offense would seem inevitably to enhance 
the risk of an unwarranted conviction." Beck v. 
-----Alabama, 447 U.S~ 675, 637 (1980). 
While this is not a capital case, neither does Appellant rely solely 
on public policy, but also on case law and Utah statutes, supra. 
Finally, it should be noted that Appellant's requested 
instructions and objections to the charge were timely, as required 
by Rule 19, Ut. R~ Crim. Pro. (R-110; & beginning at R-478). Cf. 
Rule 51, U.R.C.P. 
The result of the failure of the trial court to give the 
proper instruction is reversal~ 
"The defendant in a criminal action has a 
right to a full statement of the law from the 
court; and a neglect to give such a full state-
ment, where the jury consequently falls into 
error, is sufficient ground for reversal .... 
75 Am. Jur~ 2d, Trial §617. 
Since the evidence adduced at trial established a rational 
basis for a verdict of the lesser included offense of manslaughter, 
this court should reverse the conviction. See Elliott, supra~ 
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CONCLUSION 
Appellant presented sufficient evidence at trial to 
warrant presentation of his theories to the jury. This court 
should determine that failure to give the requestee instruction 
resulted in a reversible error. 
Respectfully submitted this .2t(.7Jl,,.day of March, 1982. 
STEPHEN R. McCAUGHEY 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
CERTIF'ICATE OF DELIVERY 
I certify that on the g~~day of March, 1982, two 
copies of the foregoing were placed for delivery by messenger to 
the Office of the Attorney General of Utah, State Capitol Building, 
Salt Lake City, Utah. 
j /r' 
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